INTRODUCTION
Three decades of econometric research have investigated whether the earnings of public-and private-sector workers are comparable. This work has used large national samples to compare the earnings of federal, state, and local workers to their private-sector counterparts (for extensive reviews, see Gregory and Borland 1999; Bender 1998; Belman and Heywood 1996) . The literature attempts to control for self-selection (Robinson and Tomes 1984; Gyourko and Tracy 1988;  AUTHORS'NOTE: The authors thank Morley Gunderson, Douglas Hyatt, Xiandong Wei, seminar participants at Lingnan University, and a reviewer for valuable comments. This article is the latest is a series of joint works that compare public-and private-sector labor markets. Previous work examines differences in fringe benefit provision, changes in pension provision over time, and the role of sample selection in estimating earnings differences. Additional joint work has focused on detailed state-by-state public earnings differentials, the U.S. Postal Service, and the methodology for determining comparability. Belman and Heywood 1989) , it investigates substantial variations in specification (Moulton 1990; Linneman and Wachter 1990; Belman and Heywood 1990) , and it uses samples specific to narrow jurisdictions (Moore and Newman 1991; Belman and Heywood 1995) . Despite these differences, the literature unanimously uses the average earnings differential to measure the degree of comparability.
The average earnings differential measures whether characteristics typical of one sector will be rewarded differently in the other. Thus, if the characteristics of a public-sector worker result in an estimated private-sector wage different from his or her actual earnings, that worker is not being paid comparably. Yet the average of such comparisons should not be taken as an estimate of comparability. If half of publicsector workers are "overpaid" by 20 percent and half are "underpaid" by 20 percent, the average differential will be close to zero, suggesting comparability when, in truth, no workers are being paid comparably. This is more than just the point that averages may not apply to each worker. Instead, it is a contention that the dispersion in individual earnings comparability must be as important as (and in many cases more important than) the average, the statistic estimated and debated. For instance, a circumstance in which every public-sector worker has a 5 percent positive differential is actually much closer to comparability than the bifurcated case presented earlier in which all workers deviate by 20 percent.
This point is crucial for at least three related reasons. First, comparability is fundamentally not an average concept. Both the relevant legal statutes and economic theory make clear that the crucial underlying notion is how many workers are how close to individual comparability (see Belman and Heywood 1996) . Yet this is the very concept on which the average differential sheds little light. Second, the potential for serious mismeasurement is systematic. It is well known that public-sector earnings show less dispersion than privatesector earnings do. Thus, individual earnings differentials favor the public sector at the bottom of the earnings distribution and the private sector at the top of the distribution. Third, the federal sector differential has shown a sizable advantage in favor of the public sector while the state and local differentials have been very small, suggesting rough comparability (Smith 1977; Quinn 1979; Moore and Raisian 1991) . Indeed, this suggestion seems so strong that many (Venti 1987; Moulton 1990; Linneman and Wachter 1990; Belman and Heywood 1993; Heywood and Mohanty 1995) focus exclusively on the federal sector. This focus is inappropriate if the small average differential in the state and local sectors hides greater dispersion in the individual differentials.
The next section argues in more detail that comparability requires measures beyond the traditional average differential. This is illustrated by estimating the average differential for each level of government and demonstrating the dispersion behind those differentials. The third section presents alternative measures of comparability that account for this dispersion, ultimately focusing on a mean squared deviation (MSD) criterion. These alternative measures demonstrate that the state and local sectors are further from comparability than the average differential implies and, contrary to earlier work, are actually less comparable than the federal sector. The third section also contrasts the importance of accounting for dispersion when estimating government earnings comparability with its near irrelevance when estimating differentials for race, gender, and union status. A final section presents a discussion and conclusions.
COMPARABILITY AND AVERAGE DIFFERENTIALS THE STANDARD OF COMPARABILITY
The level of public-sector compensation plays a role in determining the effectiveness and efficiency of government services. Too high a level wastes resources better spent on other objectives or on reducing taxes. Too low a level precludes attracting the workers needed to provide the quality of services the public demands. Thus, the standard in governmental wage setting has been one of comparability with the private sector. This standard has a 130-year history in the United States and is detailed in a wide variety of federal and state legislation and in numerous court rulings (see Belman and Heywood 1996) . While not universal, it is far and away the dominant criterion in the determination and evaluation of U.S. public-sector earnings.
The objectives the federal government hopes to achieve from comparability were outlined in the Reform Act of 1962, which provided a mechanism for implementing comparability. These objectives included using a "logical and factual" basis for the setting of federal pay, ensuring equality between otherwise similar workers in the private and federal sectors, and ensuring fairness to private-sector employers by neither underpaying nor overpaying federal workers. Economists have interpreted this and other federal government language as a governmental objective of ensuring efficiency in the employment of workers.
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Thus, while fairness is clearly an objective, there is at least some appeal to the private-sector wage being an appropriate or at least a market wage.
Even this cursory review of the objectives of comparability makes clear that the objectives apply position by position and worker by worker. Taking the example of half the public sector being overpaid by 20 percent and half being underpaid by 20 percent helps make this point. If, as a private-sector employer, you find yourself competing with a public sector that hires workers in your field at a 20 percent premium, you surely do not care that somewhere else other private employers easily pay more than the public sector. Equally compelling, public workers who enjoy a 20 percent premium do not compensate those who are at a 20 percent disadvantage. Moreover, when compared to the private sector, no public-sector workers meet the objective of equality of pay with otherwise equal private workers. Furthermore, any claim to efficiency or "the market" is surely irrelevant when you can find no workers in the public sector actually earning the private-sector wage. Even the hope of a logical and factual basis for pay setting seems not to be achieved as it seems arbitrary which workers should enjoy advantages over the private sector and which should suffer disadvantages or how large those differences should be.
In short, the concept of comparability is not an average concept. The objectives of comparability are more nearly met with a greater number of workers who are closer to receiving the same earnings in either sector. While achieving an average differential of zero indicates that the sum of log dollars spent on public compensation is identical to that which would be spent achieving comparability, it does not indicate comparability. It remains possible that some, most, or even all public employees do not receive the earnings of their private-sector counterparts. Thus, it becomes critical to evaluate the extent to which average differentials are misleading and to provide a more revealing and useful alternative measure.
These points are increasingly recognized in the literature as researchers move away from simple average wages to consider other aspects of the wage distribution. Thus, quantile regressions have been used to examine the public-private earnings differential in different portions of the wage distribution (Poterba and Rueben 1994; Mueller 1998; Blackaby, Murphy, and O'Leary 1999) . Alternatively, differentials have been estimated within different skill levels (Elliot and Duffus 1996) or for different occupational groups (Belman and Heywood 2004 ). Yet none of these studies have developed a single descriptive measure that recognizes the individual nature of the comparability standard.
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ESTIMATING AVERAGE DIFFERENTIALS
In what follows, we demonstrate that average differentials conceal a degree of dispersion that renders the estimates misleading. This sets the stage for formulating alternative measures of comparability. Following the public-sector earnings literature, this research uses the decomposition approach (Oaxaca 1973) in which natural log earnings equations are estimated separately for each sector: private, federal, state, and local. The Oaxaca decomposition is based on equations estimated as Two sets of differentials are then computed by taking a base group, the observations from either the public or government samples, and comparing the estimated earnings of that group using the other sector's equation to their estimated earnings using their own sector equation. The differential for a private employee is computed as
while a government employee's differential is computed as
Both of these estimates use only the deterministic parts of the equations and do not incorporate the error terms. These individual differentials are then averaged within the sector to provide the typical private and public base Oaxaca differential.
Our analysis uses the May 1993 Current Population Survey. We limit our sample to employed nonfarm males. This results in a final sample of 7,897 private-sector workers, 409 federal workers, 458 state workers, and 779 local workers. The specification adopted for this article is as standard as we could make it including as regressors completed education, age and age squared, region of the country, marital status, union status, race, urban residency, broad occupation, job tenure, part-time status, and establishment and firm size. While these variables match those used elsewhere, the tenor of our results does not depend greatly on the inclusion or exclusion of any particular regressor.
The estimated coefficients for educational achievement, age, and other key demographic variables are consistent with past research on pubic and private wage formation (see Table A2 in the appendix). The age/earnings profile is similar across sectors as are the roles of race, job tenure, residence in a metropolitan area (except for state employees), marital status (again, the return for state employees is lower than for the other sectors), and working part-time. Yet the pattern of returns to education varies considerably by sector. Using employees who did not complete eighth grade as the base, returns to completing a high school education are higher in federal and state government than in the private sector or local government. Returns to completing a bachelor's degree are similar across government employment, ranging from .147 to .176 log points, but the private sector return for a university degree is a much larger at .246 log points. Rewards to master's degrees are similar across the four sectors while professional degrees are most highly rewarded in federal and local government. Returns to managerial and professional occupations are highest in federal employment, similar in private and state employment, and lowest in local government. While there are substantial returns to working in larger establishments in the private sector, the coefficients on establishment size are not significant in the federal equation and, except for the large negative effects of working in very small establishments, not significant in the state and local government equations. Firm size has large positive effects on wages in the private sector but does not have a statistically meaningful effect on wages in local government. Firm size effects cannot be estimated for federal and state governments as the federal government and all state employers are in the largest size category. The fit of the equations is quite good for ordinary least squares micro-data equations: the r 2 ranges from .49 to .51. Table 1 shows private and public base differentials presenting the familiar pattern that the federal sector differences are positive (a public-sector advantage) and of reasonably large size while the state and local sector differences are smaller in magnitude and negative.
We then divide our sample into three separate occupational groupings-blue-collar, white-collar, and service workers-and re- Belman, Heywood / EARNINGS DISPERSION 573 peat the estimation within each grouping. In Table 1 , we present the private-sector base estimates. They indicate a large public-sector advantage for service workers at the local and federal level (especially large at the federal level) and a small disadvantage for service workers at the state level. At the same time, white-collar workers appear substantially underpaid in the local sector and blue-collar workers appear substantially underpaid in the state sector. Thus, we easily identify groups of public-sector workers who appear substantially overpaid and groups who appear substantially underpaid. This happens even within the local sector where the overall differentials indicate near comparability. This is exactly the scenario we described in the introduction and makes compelling the need to develop a measure of comparability that does not allow the averaging of over-and underpayment.
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF THE COMPARABILITY MODIFYING THE PUBLIC-SECTOR MEASURE
Perfect earnings comparability should be identified as the circumstance in which every individual differential (those traditionally averaged) is zero. Thus, a first approach might measure the difference from comparability by averaging the absolute value of the difference in the individual predictions. This measure indicates how far away on average worker wages are from comparability, the positives and negatives not canceling out. This is easily constructed from the estimates 574 PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW of each worker's wage in their current position and what they would earn in the alternative sector.
This new measure, the absolute differential, is presented in the first two columns of Table 2 . Averaging across the two bases, the federal differential is 13.2 while the state and local differentials are actually larger, each at 15.5. This pattern contrasts with the consistently larger federal average differential in the literature and indicates that the assumption that attention should be paid primarily to the federal differential is misplaced. While all sectors evidence canceling out in the average differential, the federal differential is subject to less than the others.
A related alternative measure establishes an a priori band that approximates comparability and determines what share of workers fall within that band. As an illustration, imagine a band of 5 percent either side of exact comparability. Any individual worker with an earnings advantage or disadvantage of smaller than 5 percent would be included among those paid in accord with comparability. Using the individual differentials, we compute just this measure for all three public sectors. As the third and fourth columns of Table 2 show, only a small minority of public employees are paid wages approximately comparable. Again, the impression that the federal sector is the least comparable receives no support. Averaging across the bases, the shares identified as close to comparable are .192 in the state sector, .223 in the local sector, and .254 in the federal sector. Obviously, there is nothing unique about a band of 5 percent. The point is that creating an a priori band independent of the distribution of the individual differential allows for a measure that identifies the share of the workforce that is paid a roughly comparable wage. 5 We suggest as a final alternative a MSD criterion that isolates both the information contained in the average differential and information Belman, Heywood / EARNINGS DISPERSION 575 that concerns us, the dispersion in the individual differential. Putting aside the distinction between public and private base differentials for the moment, the differential for any given worker can be identified as
where the first part of the center term is the estimated earnings of the public-sector worker and the second part of the center term is the estimated private-sector earnings of that same worker.
6
The typical Oaxaca estimate can use either an actual or predicted value for an individual's "own" sector wage. We use estimates of the own and other sector log wage. Thus, by design, θ i is purely a prediction and does not include an error term.
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At issue is how far that value is from comparability. Identify θ c as the ideal value of equation (1), which reflects full comparability and is thus zero. Then the MSD criterion can be expressed as 6) and, as with the typical Oaxaca, can be estimated separately with private and government bases. As θ c is zero, this amounts to simply the average squared value of the individual public-sector worker differentials and will be strictly positive. The advantage of this measure compared to the absolute differential is in interpretation. By adding and subtracting the mean value of θ i and by expanding the square identified in equation (6), the criterion can be rewritten as
576 PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW where θ is the mean of the θ i s, the conventional public sector differential, in the sample of size n. This allows the criterion to be thought of as consisting of two components. The second component, the square of the average differential, is analogous to the bias in an estimator. This value will be zero whenever the log dollar volume of earnings in the public sector is identical to that which would be paid in the private sector for the same workers. The first component is the variance in individual differentials from the sample mean. This component reflects the dispersion in the comparability treatment of public-sector workers. If workers all have the same value of θ, whether large or small, this first component will be zero. Thus, another way of phrasing the objection to the average differential as a measure of comparability is that it excludes the potentially crucial role played by the variance in individual comparability.
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Although it is possible to calculate a combined Oaxaca decomposition for public and private employees, it has been more typical to calculate a private base differential using the characteristics of private employees and a public base differential using the characteristics of public employees. This approach recognizes that differences between the characteristics of typical public and private employees results in different measures of comparability and that the increase in the number of measures is balanced by the greater insight into nature of comparability. We follow this tradition in Table 3 , which presents the values for the MSD criterion for both the private and public sector base.
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In all cases, the log differences have been multiplied by one hundred so the numbers presented are not extremely small. Each value of the criterion is broken into its components, the variance and the aggregate differential squared. Thus, starting with the federal private base estimate, the variance in the individual differential is 319 and the average differential squared is 91 (9.55, the value from Table 1, squared) for a total MSD criterion of 410. This procedure is repeated for the other sectors and for the public-sector bases. Table 3 makes clear two fundamental points. First, the bias component represents only a small portion of the deviation from comparability. Even in the federal sector, the bias component accounts for less than a quarter of the MSD. Thus, if policy makers adjusted all federal wages by the average differential, they would not come close to Belman, Heywood / EARNINGS DISPERSION 577 achieving comparability. Second, the MSD continues to suggest that the federal sector is, if anything, closer to comparability. If the two bases are averaged, the MSD is 296 in the federal sector, 338 in the state sector, and 365 in the local sector. At minimum, there is no evidence that federal government pay-setting policies deserve more scrutiny than those of state and local governments.
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As a further illustration of the MSD criterion, we return to the occupational breakdown that we explored in section 2. Recall that whitecollar workers had very disparate measures of the average differential, with the federal sector appearing to overpay between 8 and 9 percent, the state sector appearing comparable, and the local sector underpaying about 10 percent. Again, using the private base estimates, the MSD mimics the full sample. The average differential contributes only a small share of the deviation from comparability. The state sector, which had an average white-collar differential of essentially zero, has such a large variance that its MSD exceeds that in the federal sector. The pattern again shows the federal sector closest to comparability. The policy implication is that governments, state and local in particular, should emphasize the pattern of earnings rather than the average level. To achieve comparability, the large set of workers paid more than a comparable wage and the large set of workers paid less 578 PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW than a comparable wage should receive separate attention. The use of predictions in the measures described above implies that the variance has both a population and sample component. As the appendix and Table A2 show, adjusting for the effect of sampling error does not change the basic results or this policy implication.
COMPARISONS WITH MEASURES FOR RACE, GENDER, AND UNIONS
This subsection provides a short illustration of why earnings dispersion is particularly relevant in estimating government earnings comparability. In short, many of the other differentials estimated with the average differential are more appropriately done so, and moreover, accounting for the individual variance in the differential does not greatly alter the pattern presented by the average differential. To show this point, we compare our previous estimates for public-sector earnings comparability with analogous estimates for earnings comparability by race, gender, and union status.
The Oaxaca decomposition was originally used to estimate earnings differentials by race and gender. At issue was whether a protected group earned less on average after holding human capital constant. Indeed, many labor economics texts virtually define earnings discrimination in this fashion.
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Yet while an average race or gender differential of zero indicates the absence of group discrimination, an average public-sector differential of zero does not indicate comparability. Discrimination is a group concept, but comparability is an individual concept that, as an objective of public policy, can be achieved only at a less aggregate level. Table 4 presents gender, race, and union differentials estimated for our sample. 14 As is apparent, in each case, the average differential is closer to those that account for dispersion than is the case with the average government differential. The absolute differential that accounts for canceling out is very similar to the average differential. Unlike the public-sector mean squared error measures, those in Table 4 are largely driven by the bias showing that dispersion is a less important component. Thus, the very case of public-sector comparability in which dispersion is theoretically pertinent is the case in which the individual dispersion in the differential plays the greatest role.
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CONCLUSIONS
Comparability is a disaggregate concept that should be evaluated by indicating how many workers are how close to individual differentials of zero. The average differential used in the literature does not indicate this information.
We presented three initial alternative measures of comparability: the absolute differential, the percentage of the workforce that falls within a comparability band, and the MSD criterion. Ultimately, all three alternative measures reveal a pattern not evident in the traditional measure. The state and local sectors that appear closer to comparability with the average differential are not in reality any closer.
The emphasis in past literature on the federal sector's deviating the most from comparability appears wrong. While the federal sector may pay positive premiums to a larger share of its workforce, those premiums are small. More important, the state and local sector pay both larger positive and larger negative premiums as revealed in the larger variance in their individual comparability measures. As a consequence, it may well be the state and local sectors that deviate most from comparability. While our estimates are dependent on a single data source and need to be replicated before they should be taken for granted, the point is not the specific estimates but the need to move away from average differentials. 
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APPENDIX Removing the Effects of Sampling Error from the Mean Squared Deviation Criterion
As with all predictions, the variance of the predicted earnings gap in the mean squared deviation (MSD) is composed of a population and a sample component. The latter results because estimated rather than actual coefficients are used to form the prediction. Ideally, the MSD measure would use only the population component of variance.
Consider the variance component of the MSD:
( , where the subscript s refers to the sector for which the MSD is constructed, p or g. Substituting the regression equations for zero,
which is rearranged to ( )
Consider the first term:
where V is the variance matrix of the government regression. The first term is the population component, and the second is the sample component. The second term of equation (3) (2) gives the two components equal weight, α = β = 1. 11. Clearly, equations (1) through (3) could have been expressed with θ defined as the difference between an estimated public wage and the actual private wage. This generates the alternative private-sector base estimate of the MSD criterion.
12. Bender (2003) adopted our MSD measure to test for comparability of central government earnings in the United Kingdom.
13. Wachtel (1992, 226) argued that if low earnings were randomly distributed by race and gender, there would be no possibility of discrimination.
14. Obviously, we added women to complete the gender estimate.
